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We investigated the effects of probability on visual search. Previous work has shown
that people can utilize spatial and sequential probability information to improve target
detection. We hypothesized that performance improvements from probability information
would extend to the efficiency of visual search. Our task was a simple visual search in
which the target was always present among a field of distractors, and could take one of
two colors. The absolute probability of the target being either color was 0.5; however, the
conditional probability—the likelihood of a particular color given a particular combination
of two cues—varied from 0.1 to 0.9. We found that participants searched more efficiently
for high conditional probability targets and less efficiently for low conditional probability
targets, but only when they were explicitly informed of the probability relationship
between cues and target color.
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INTRODUCTION
The effects of cues in attentional tasks are well documented
(Posner and Cohen, 1984; Wright and Ward, 2008; Carrasco,
2011). For the most part, cuing and attention are framed in terms
of valid/invalid and present/absent, but such binary character-
izations may obscure important distinctions (Anderson, 2011),
particularly that attentional effects may operate on a continuum.
In addition, it may be that there are more direct accounts for
the source of attentional effects that also naturally account for
its continuous nature. Probability is one such alternative char-
acterization. In the introduction, we briefly highlight some of
the earlier work showing cue effects that vary in proportion to
probability information about target features. From these data,
we hypothesize that the efficiency of search should also improve
when cues communicate a target’s probable features.
As far back as 1980, it has been recognized that cuing is not
an all or none process and that cue effects are graded by validity
(Jonides, 1980; Eriksen and Yeh, 1985; Madden, 1992; Riggio and
Kirsner, 1997). Jonides (1980) employed a circular 8-item search
display in which subjects were shown a neutral, valid, or invalid
cue, and the predictive value of the valid cue varied between 30,
50, and 70%. The magnitudes of reaction time (RT) cost (for
invalid cues) and benefit (for valid cues) increased in proportion
to the validity of the cue. Eriksen and Yeh (1985) presented sub-
jects with an identical display and varied the predictive value of
both a primary spatial cue and a secondary spatial cue, and also
found that RTs improved in proportion to the predictive value
of the cues. Many of these data are well described by a Bayesian
characterization of visual search (Vincent et al., 2009; Ma et al.,
2011).
The last decade has seen an increase in interest on this topic.
Vossel et al. (2006) collected fMRI and RT data in a slight vari-
ation of Posner’s (Posner et al., 1980) seminal cuing task. They
varied cue validity between a 60% condition and a 90% condition,
confirming the finding that greater cue validity resulted in faster
RTs and showing that cue validity modulates activation in a right-
hemispheric fronto-parietal attentional network. In a similar
design, Gould et al. (2011) also demonstrate such a relationship
between cue validity and RT. Hahn et al. (2006) demonstrated
probability spatial cuing effects in a simple search task. Targets
occurred at one of four peripheral locations, and a central sym-
bolic cue indicated which quadrants were of greater probability
for a particular trial. Any number (up to all four) of the quad-
rants could be cued on any given trial, and the cue validity was
80%, regardless of the number of quadrants cued. This yielded
a graded cue validity ranging from 25% (all quadrants cued) to
80% (one quadrant cued). The primary behavioral result was
a monotonic relationship between the number of primed posi-
tions and RT, with fewer primed locations (and thus greater cue
validity) generating faster RTs. These results both reinforce and
affirm probabilistic effects in attentional tasks with more complex
methods (serial search) and modern methodologies (fMRI).
The vast majority of work on graded cuing effects has involved
spatial cues. To our knowledge, there is only one investigation of
graded effects of feature cue validity. Egner et al. (2008) explored
spatial and feature cuing when the predictive value of the cues was
parametrically varied. They utilized a simple search task in which
a fixed grid of four locations contained diamonds that were either
red or blue in color and left or right in spatial position. Central
cues communicated independent information about location and
color of the target. The validity of the spatial and color cues was
50, 70, or 90%, and the probability that any particular diamond
was the target was the product of the individual cues. The task
required the participants to locate the target diamond, which was
distinguished by a missing corner. The principle result was a rela-
tionship for cue predictive value and RT. Trials with 90% valid
cues were faster than 70% valid cue trials, and 90% invalid cue tri-
als (or alternatively, 10% predictive value) were slower than 70%
invalid cue trials (alternatively, 30% predictive value). There was
no significant effect of cue dimension, meaning that both spatial
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and feature cues had equivalent effects. The relationship was non-
linear because themagnitude of cuing effects between 70 and 90%
was less than that for 50 and 70%. The magnitude of each cue
was greatest when the other was non-informative (50% predictive
value). While this study demonstrates attentional effects for prob-
ability cues (color) it did not vary the number of display elements,
thus leaving open the question of whether probability cuing also
affects the efficiency of search.
When tested, the relationship between attention and cue pre-
dictive value is found to be graded rather than all or none. What
defines a cue’s predictive value is its probabilistic relation to
the target. This asserts an equivalence between cues and prior
probability. There is a great deal of evidence that such statistical
relationships can be learned implicitly and on line (Saffran et al.,
1996, 1997, 1999; Chun and Jiang, 1998, 1999; Chun, 2000; Fiser
and Aslin, 2001, 2002; Geng and Behrmann, 2002, 2005; Jiang and
Leung, 2005; Ono et al., 2005; Williams et al., 2009; Druker and
Anderson, 2010; Jiang et al., 2013).
We are aware of comparatively few studies that have investi-
gated non-spatial aspects of probability learning. Chun and Jiang
(1999) implemented a variation on their previous (Chun and
Jiang, 1998) search task in which instead of searching for a T
among L’s, participants searched for a shape with a vertical axis of
symmetry among shapes with non-vertical axes of symmetry, and
they found that distractor identities were effective cues of unique
target identity. However, Endo and Takeda (2004) employed a
slightly modified version of the same Chun and Jiang (1998) task,
in which participants searched for a closed contour among open
contours. They found that although target position could be cued
both by distractor position and distractor identity, target iden-
tity could not be effectively cued by either distractor position or
identity. Although the findings of these two studies on statisti-
cal learning in search are contradictory, a growing body of work
using non-search paradigms suggests that non-spatial probabili-
ties, including feature probabilities similar to those of interest in
the current work, can be learned (Fiser and Aslin, 2001, 2002;
Kirkham et al., 2002; Turk-Browne et al., 2005, 2008; Baldwin
et al., 2008; Brady and Oliva, 2008; Brady et al., 2009). To take
an example from the listed works, Fiser and Aslin (2001, 2002)
demonstrated that participants can learn joint and conditional
probabilities for sequences; though the authors frame this result
as learning “groups” of related stimuli independently of order, it
can be viewed as one item in the sequence probabilistically cuing
the features of a subsequent item. This suggests that the learn-
ing of probability relationships need not be limited to spatial
tasks.
To test our hypothesis that probabilistic cuing affects search
efficiency, we performed four experiments where participants’
performed a challenging visual search task. For all experiments
participants searched for the one diamond out of several that had
one of its four corners missing. They reported which corner was
absent. The target diamond was camouflaged by varying num-
bers of distractor diamonds. In Experiment 1, a combination of
two cues provided statistical information about the likely color of
the target diamond. To test that any benefits seen in Experiment 1
were not explained by color priming alone, Experiment 2 utilized
the same cues and targets, but without any predictable probability
information. To examine if it was necessary for the cues and tar-
gets to share the salient feature (color in this case) we performed
Experiment 3 where one of the cues was made more abstract
(present or absent). Lastly, in Experiment 4 we tested whether or
not participants had to be explicitly informed of the cue target
probability relationship.
METHODS
The methods were similar for all four experiments and are pre-
sented here with the salient difference highlighted when the
results are presented.
PARTICIPANTS
Participants in all experiments were University of Waterloo
undergraduate students. Experiment 1 had 10 participants (one
male, nine females); Experiment 2 had 10 participants (six males,
four females); Experiment 3 had 18 participants (four males, 14
females); Experiment 4 had 60 (20 per between subjects con-
dition) participants (25 males, 34 females, one undeclared) of
which one was dropped for low accuracy (over 5 SD below the
mean). The University of Waterloo Office of Research Ethics
approved the research and informed consent was obtained from
all participants.
PROCEDURES
Participants completed five blocks of 100 trials of a visual search
task. As shown in the first panel of Figure 1, participants viewed
two cues in sequence, each for 1000ms, followed by a search array.
Panel 2 gives a detailed view of the experimental stimuli.
The first cue was always in the center of the screen, while the
second cue appeared at a random location. During the search
task, the second cue remained on the screen and N (8, 12, 16,
or 20) items appeared on the screen, all in random locations. The
items consisted of a single target, which was a diamond shape with
one corner missing, and (N − 1) distractors, which were intact
diamonds. These items remained until the participant indicated
with a button press that they had located the target. After this
button press, the search array disappeared and participants were
FIGURE 1 | Experiment 1 task flow and magnified stimuli. Cue 1
appeared in the center of the screen for 1 s. After it disappeared, cue 2
appeared in a random location. After another 1-s interval, the search array
appeared with the target and all distractors in random, non-overlapping
locations. Possible stimuli colors were magenta and cyan. The size of every
stimulus was 0.8 degrees of visual angle. Participants reported which of the
four corners of the target was missing with the corresponding arrow key on
the computer keyboard.
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prompted to indicate which corner of the target was missing by
pressing the corresponding arrow key on a computer keyboard.
The relation between the cues and target color varied between
experiments. In Experiment 1 the absolute probability of a par-
ticular color target on any given trial was 0.5; however, the
conditional probability—the likelihood of a particular target color
given a particular cue combination—varied from 0.1 (when both
cues predicted the non-target color) to 0.5 (when one cue pre-
dicted the target color and the other predicted the non-target
color) to 0.9 (when both cues predicted the target color). For
example, if both cues were magenta, the target was 90% likely
to be magenta and 10% likely to be cyan; if one cue was cyan
and the other cue was magenta, the target was 50% likely to be
magenta and 50% likely to be cyan. The coloring of the target and
distractors was selected on an item by item basis. This means that
while the colors cyan and magenta were equally likely overall, on
individual trials the number and proportion of each color varied.
Panel 1 in Figure 2 shows the full conditional probability distri-
bution for the cues in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2 the same
cue color combinations were used, but the conditional probabil-
ity information was eliminated. In Experiment 3 the probability
information was retained, but the second cue was no longer col-
ored. It was either present or absent. The cues and the probability
information in Experiment 4 were identical to Experiment 1;
only the instructions to participants changed. Figure 2 provides
a graphical summary of these details.
For Experiments 1, 2, and 3 participants were explicitly
instructed at the beginning of the task about the cue target rela-
tionships. As an example, the exact wording used to communicate
FIGURE 2 | All possible cue combinations and their associated target
color probabilities for each experiment. Experiments 1 and 4 used the
same cue conditions (in Experiment 4 we manipulated the instructions
given to participants). In Experiment 1 when both cues were the same
color (cyan or magenta) the target was 90% likely to be that color. When
the cues were different colors, they were uninformative as to the target
color. In Experiment 2, all cue combinations were uninformative. In
Experiment 3, the presence or absence (counterbalanced across
participants) of cue 2 indicated the validity of cue 1; a valid cue 1 predicted
target color with 90% accuracy.
the relationship between cues and targets in Experiment 1 was,
“. . . if both cues are red, the target is very likely to be red; if both
cues are green, the target is very likely to be green; if the cues
are each a different color, the target is equally likely to be red
or green.” Subjects were told that the second cue would appear
in a random position on the screen, and that the location of the
second cue was not predictive of any aspect of the search task.
Distractor color ratios were not fixed. Ratios were generated
for each trial by assigning each distractor, one by one, a color.
This color assignment was weighted by the proportion of colors
already assigned to the target and all distractors. The probability
of a distractor receiving a certain color was equal to the propor-
tion of stimuli (target + distractors) of the other color. So if there
were 3 cyan stimuli and 4 magenta stimuli in an 8-item trial, the
last stimulus had a probability of 4/7 to be cyan. This algorithm
for generating distractor colors resulted in ratios that converged
on 1:1 quite rapidly, and the ratio distribution across all trials was
hyper-normal, centered on 1:1.
APPARATUS
Participants sat at a viewing distance of approximately 65 cm
from a flat CRT monitor (36.5 × 27.5 cm viewable area, approx-
imately 31◦ × 24◦ of visual angle computed at screen center)
running at 85Hz and at 800 × 600 resolution. All stimuli (cues,
target, and distractors) subtended 0.8 degrees of visual angle and
were presented on a black background. The stimulus presentation
program was written in Python and used the Psychopy library
(Peirce, 2007).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In all experiments, there were no significant effects of target color;
magenta or cyan, the RT did not differ. For trials where the two
cues were a different color, the order of presentation did not mat-
ter. That is, there was no additional benefit or deficit when the
second cue color matched the target color compared to when
the first cue did. Therefore, all analyses collapse across these fac-
tors. This yields a 3 (conditional probability) × 4 (number of
stimuli in search display) design. Accuracy in all experiments
was near-perfect (98.7% overall; above 98% for each individual
experiment) and did not differ between any conditions in any
experiments; because of this uniformity, accuracy is not reported
below. Analyses used the RTs from correct trials only. As sub-
300ms trials had chance levels (33%) of accuracy, we categorized
these as accidental button presses and excluded them. Trials over
10 s were more than three standard deviations greater than the
mean RT (in all experiments) and we excluded them as reflect-
ing extended periods of off-task behavior. These timing cutoffs
resulted in the following proportions of dropped trials: 1.12%
in Experiment 1; 1.72% in Experiment 2; 1.14% in Experiment
3; and 2.98% in Experiment 4. At debriefing, no participants
reported using any particular search strategy; thus, no partic-
ipants were dropped from the analysis on this basis for any
experiment.
Experiment 1 showed that RTs were faster for trials where the
cues predicted target features and that the RT—stimulus number
slope increased different across probability conditions. A repeated
measures ANOVA with RT as the dependent variable, and with
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FIGURE 3 | RTs by distractor number for Experiment 1. The higher the
conditional probability, the faster and more efficient the search.
conditional probability (3 levels: 0.1, 0.5, 0.9) and number of
stimuli (4 levels: 8, 12, 16, 20) as factors (Figure 3) found that
RT increased with number of stimuli, F(3, 27) = 96.29, p < 0.001,
and decreased with conditional probability, F(2, 18) = 18.01, p <
0.001. There was also a conditional probability by number of
stimuli interaction, F(6, 54) = 7.451, p < 0.001, indicating that as
the number of stimuli increased, the effect of conditional prob-
ability became larger. To phrase this result more conventionally,
the distractor number × RT slope decreases as conditional prob-
ability increases. Distractor number × RT slope is an index of
visual search efficiency (Wolfe et al., 1989; Wolfe, 1994, 1998,
2007). Experiment 1 demonstrated that participants are faster
to locate and report targets with high conditional probability,
and that this change in performance is accompanied by changes
in the efficiency of search. One strategy that was suggested as
a basis for this result was that participants exhaustively search
the cued color first. This is unlikely. First, no participant in this
(or any subsequent) experiment reported using such a strategy
in the post-questionnaire (in fact, no participants reported using
any conscious search strategy). Second, RT is better explained by
the total number of targets and not just those of the same, high
probability color. We formally tested this using linear models (R
Development Core Team, 2011). First, we subselected the trials
where both cues were of a single color and the target was of the
same color. Under the assumption that participants exhaustively
search the cued color first, there should be no effect of the number
of distractors of the uncued color, because for this subset of trials
the participant will never need to search any of them. Two linear
models were generated and compared. Model 1 took into account
only the number of stimuli on the screen that were of the same
color as the target and the cues. Model 2 added as a factor the
number of cued-color stimuli and the number of uncued-color
stimuli. Table 1 shows the intercepts and coefficients.
Both models demonstrate that as the number of display items
of the same color as the target and cues increases so does the RT.
Model 2 shows that there is the same relationship for display items
Table 1 | Intercepts and coefficients for the models generated by
simple linear regression on the data from the 0.9 conditional
probability condition in Experiment 1.
Model 1: rt = α+ β1(number cued − color stimuli)
Value SE df t Significance
α 1.042 0.086 2199 12.10 p < 0.001
β1 0.163 0.012 2199 14.11 p < 0.001
Model 2: rt = α+ β1(number cued − color stimuli) +
β2(number uncued − color stimuli)
α 0.929 0.089 2198 10.448 p < 0.001
β1 0.113 0.015 2198 7.310 p < 0.001
β2 0.077 0.016 2198 4.773 p < 0.001
of the “wrong” color as well. Since these models are nested we can
compare the increase in goodness of fit with a chi-square ratio
test (Bentler and Bonett, 1980). This is implemented in R with
the ANOVA function (Chambers and Hastie, 1992). Model 1 had
an R2 = 0.083, F(1, 2199) = 199.1, p < 0.001, and Model 2 has an
R2 = 0.092, F(2, 2198) = 111.9, p < 0.001. Comparing themodels
directly verifies the improvement in fit from model 1 to model 2,
F(1, 2198) = 22.781, p < 0.001. Although the improvement in fit
is objectively small, the strong correlation between the number of
cued and uncued stimuli (r = 0.94) leaves very little variance for
the number of uncued-color distractors term to explain. That the
addition of such a term, with such small explanatory potential,
nonetheless results in an improvement in fit provides strong evi-
dence that participants are not simply engaging in an exclusive,
exhaustive search of cued-color items.
Although the second cue remains on screen during the search,
the models described above do not consider it as a stimulus for
two reasons. First, it is different in form from the true distrac-
tors; second, it is present on the screen for a full second before the
search array is displayed, giving the participant time to recognize
and categorize it as not part of the search array. Additionally, in
the high conditional probability data, the second cue color always
matches the target: so even if participants were responding to the
second cue as a distractor during search, it would have no impact
on the structure or fit of either model.
In Experiment 2 we kept the cue and target colors the same,
but eliminated the conditional probability information commu-
nicated by cue congruence. Thus, if the reduction in RT were
completely explained by color priming, that is that two magenta
(cyan) targets sped the detection of a subsequent magenta (cyan)
target, regardless of probability information, then Experiment
2’s results (Figure 4) should look identical with Experiment 1’s
(Figure 3). As shown in Figure 4 this is not the case, and the lack
of an effect of color congruency on RT was confirmed statistically.
A repeated measures ANOVA with RT as the dependent variable,
and with congruent color cues (3 levels: 0, 1, 2) and number of
stimuli (4 levels: 8, 12, 16, 20) as factors revealed a significant
effect of the number of stimuli, F(3, 27) = 115.587, p < 0.001.
However, there was no effect of the number of congruent color
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FIGURE 4 | Response times by distractor number for Experiment 2.
When probability cuing is removed, search efficiency is equal regardless of
color priming.
cues F(2, 18) = 0.451, p = 0.644, and no number of stimuli by
congruent color cues interaction F(6, 54) = 1.433, p = 0.219. This
supports our hypothesis that it is conditional probability, not
color priming, driving the effect on search efficiency. However,
from the data in Experiments 1 and 2, we still cannot discount
the possibility that the conditional probability information is nec-
essary but not sufficient to drive the observed effects on search
efficiency; it could be that the combination of color priming and
conditional probability is modulating search efficiency. Although
this objection seems somewhat more unlikely than that raised
with regard to color priming alone, we nonetheless sought to
address it in Experiment 3.
Experiment 3 reinstated themanipulation of conditional prob-
ability, but the appearance of the cues that delivered the condi-
tional probability information to the participant was changed. In
Experiments 1 and 2, the second cue was a circle with two pos-
sible states. State 1 (magenta) indicated an increased conditional
probability of magenta, and state 2 (cyan) indicated an increased
conditional probability of cyan. In Experiment 3, the second cue
changed visually to a white circle that was either present (state
1) or absent (state 2). Panel 3 in Figure 2 shows the cues and
conditional probability distribution for Experiment 3. In this
Experiment 3, cue 2 was indirect and indicated whether the first
cue was predictive or non-predictive. This change had two effects:
it eliminated half of the color priming from the task, and it made
the relationship between cues and target more complicated.
Figure 5 shows that with return of the cue-target probability
relationship there was a return to the difference in search slopes.
A repeated measures ANOVA with RT as the dependent variable,
and with conditional probability (3 levels: 0.1, 0.5, 0.9) and num-
ber of stimuli (4 levels: 8, 12, 16, 20) as factors demonstrated a
pattern of effects for Experiment 3 identical to Experiment 1; RT
increased with number of stimuli, F(3, 51) = 158.34, p < 0.001,
and decreased with conditional probability, F(2, 34) = 18.239, p <
0.001, and there was a conditional probability by number of
FIGURE 5 | Response times by distractor number for Experiment 3.
Search efficiency is modulated by conditional probability even when color
priming is reduced.
stimuli interaction, F(6, 102) = 5.458, p < 0.001, again showing
that the effect of conditional probability was accompanied by
changes in efficiency; however, unlike Experiment 1, changes
in search efficiency were not observed between baseline condi-
tional probability and high conditional probability. That is, when
low conditional probability trials were excluded from the anal-
ysis, there was no interaction between number of stimuli and
conditional probability, F(3, 51) = 1.160, p = 0.330.
The perseverance of this effect when color priming was
reduced, but not when conditional probability was removed, indi-
cates that probability alone drives the observed effects on visual
search efficiency.
We also replicated our linear modeling from Experiment 1
on the data from Experiment 3. Model 1 (number of cued-color
distractors as the only predictor) yields R2 = 0.104, F(1, 3910) =
454.5, p < 0.001, while model 2 yields R2 = 0.123, F(2, 3909) =
274.2, p < 0.001. Again, testing the nested models confirms that
the improvement in fit is significant, F(1, 3909) = 84.177, p <
0.001. Table 2 shows the intercepts and coefficients for each
model.
In this experiment, the baseline condition is not a product
of conflicting information from cue 1 and cue 2. Rather, one
color or the other is cued, after which the searcher receives infor-
mation about the validity of this information from the purely
symbolic second cue. In contrast to Experiment 1, where it is
unclear what the motivation or mechanism might be for select-
ing or acting based on one cue over the other, here it seems
quite possible that searchers might disregard the actual valid-
ity of the second (symbolic) cue entirely, and search as if the
first (color) cue was always valid. Instead, or in addition, there
might be a degree of automaticity to the high conditional prob-
ability search behaviors which participants might be unable to
completely suppress when predictive and non-predictive cues are
interspersed. Figure 6 illustrates how performance differed based
on this distinction.
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Table 2 | Intercepts and coefficients for the models generated by
simple linear regression on the data from the 0.9 conditional
probability condition in Experiment 3.
Model 1: rt = α+ β1(number cued − color stimuli)
Value SE df t Significance
α 0.878 0.068 3910 12.94 p < 0.001
β1 0.195 0.009 3910 21.32 p < 0.001
Model 2: rt = α+ β1(number cued − color stimuli)
+β2(number uncued − color stimuli)
α 0.726 0.069 3909 10.492 p < 0.001
β1 0.122 0.012 3909 10.105 p < 0.001
β2 0.111 0.012 3909 9.175 p < 0.001
FIGURE 6 | Response times by distractor number for each of the three
conditional probabilities in Experiment 3. Cue 1 never matched the
target color when conditional probability was 0.1, always matched when
conditional probability was 0.9, and matched half the time when conditional
probability was 0.5.
Congruity of the first cue with the target color affects search
behavior, even when that cue is indicated to be non-predictive.
When conditional probability is held constant (at 0.5) partici-
pants are faster to respondwhen the target colormatches the color
of the (non-predictive) first cue, F(1, 17) = 24.834, p < 0.001, and
trend toward being more efficient, F(3, 51) = 2.630, p = 0.060.
When cue 1 color matches target color, search trends toward
being faster for high conditional probability than for the base-
line conditional probability, F(1, 17) = 3.495, p = 0.079, but there
is little evidence that it becomes more efficient, F(3, 51) = 1.301,
p = 0.284; when cue 1 color does not match target color, search
is slower, F(1, 17) = 5.558, p < 0.05, and less efficient, F(3, 51) =
3.050, p < 0.05, for low conditional probability compared to the
baseline conditional probability.
Both possibilities outlined above would be expected to pro-
duce these effects: fast RTs for high conditional probability, slow
RTs for low conditional probability, and a mix of fast and slow
RTs in the baseline condition, depending on the validity of the
(non-predictive) color cue. Within this paradigm, it is difficult
to differentiate the perception-driven explanation (simplification
of the cuing) and the action-driven explanation (inability to
suppress automatic search behaviors). However, this distinction,
while intriguing, is of secondary interest in this experiment.
Having established that conditional probability modulates
visual search efficiency we wondered if this modulation depends
on explicit knowledge of conditional probability information.
Howmuch knowledge of conditional probability could be learned
or deduced simply through the act of searching? Experiment
4 investigates these questions by varying amount and quality
of information provided to participants about the conditional
probabilities in the task. Essentially, Experiment 1 was repeated,
but there were three different sets of participant instructions.
Participants in the full information condition received a full
description of the relationship between cues and target color
(this condition was an exact replication of Experiment 1, and
participants received identical information and instructions).
Participants in the no information condition were not informed
of the relationship between cues and target color. Participants in
the misleading information condition were told explicitly (and
incorrectly) that there was no relationship between the cues and
target color.
Figure 7 illustrates the results of Experiment 4. Data in this
experiment were analyzed by conducting an ANOVA with RT
as the dependent variable, conditional probability (3 levels:
0.1, 0.5, 0.9) and number of stimuli (4 levels: 8, 12, 16, 20)
as within-subjects factors, and information condition (3 lev-
els: full information, no information, misleading information)
as a between-subjects factor. Again, response time increased
with number of stimuli, F(3, 167) = 398.159, p < 0.001. There
was a main effect of conditional probability F(2, 110) = 10.866,
p < 0.001 and this effect differed across information conditions
F(4, 110) = 9.236, p < 0.001. There was no effect of conditional
probability in the no information condition F(2, 34) = 1.751, p =
0.188. In the misleading information condition, there was an
effect of conditional probability F(2, 38) = 3.543, p < 0.05, but
only for the low conditional probability targets, which partici-
pants were slower to locate. However, in the correct information
condition, the pattern from Experiment 1 was repeated, with
faster search RTs for high conditional probability and slower
RTs for low conditional probability, F(2, 38) = 17.429, p < 0.001.
Evidence for an efficiency component to these differences was
present in this condition as well, with a trending number for the
stimuli by conditional probability interaction, F(6, 114) = 2.019,
p = 0.069.
RT benefits from learning the probabilities in the task would
be expected to take time to emerge in the uninformed and mis-
informed conditions. Although there was an effect of block in
both conditions, F(4, 72) = 3.148, p < 0.05 for uninformed and
F(4, 72) = 2.588, p < 0.05 for misinformed, there was no block by
conditional probability interaction in either condition, F(8, 136) =
1.474, p = 0.172 (uninformed) and F(8, 144) = 1.320, p = 0.238
(misinformed). On this basis, we conclude that there was no
learning of the probability information in either condition for this
task over the roughly 1 h participants spent in the laboratory.
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FIGURE 7 | Response times by distractor number for Experiment 4.
Conditional probability modulates search efficiency only when participants
have explicit knowledge.
Table 3 | Intercepts and coefficients for the models generated by
simple linear regression on the data from the full information, 0.9
conditional probability condition in Experiment 4.
Model 1: rt = α+ β1(number cued − color stimuli)
Value SE df t Significance
α 0.891 0.062 4430 14.28 p < 0.001
β1 0.193 0.008 4430 22.98 p < 0.001
Model 2: rt = α+ β1(number cued − color stimuli)
+β2(number uncued − color stimuli)
α 0.749 0.089 4429 11.84 p < 0.001
β1 0.115 0.011 4429 10.30 p < 0.001
β2 0.114 0.011 4429 10.26 p < 0.001
Since the full information condition is an exact replication
of Experiment 1, we replicate our linear modeling analysis from
Experiments 1 and 3 on these data. As in Experiments 1 and
3, we generate a model 1 which includes only the number of
cued-color stimuli term, and a model 2 which includes terms
for both number of cued-color stimuli and number of uncued-
color stimuli. Model 1 yields R2 = 0.107, F(1, 4430) = 527.9, p <
0.001, while model 2 yields R2 = 0.127, F(2, 4429) = 322.8, p <
0.001. Goodness of fit comparisons of the nestedmodels confirms
that the improvement in fit is significant, F(1, 4429) = 105.36,
p < 0.001. Table 3 details the intercepts and coefficients for each
model.
It is notable that, in the misleading information condition,
participants are slower to locate and report low conditional
probability targets, but no faster to report higher conditional
probability targets (both compared to the baseline condi-
tional probability condition). Not only did participants perform
differently in response to differences in conditional probability
that they had been explicitly told did not exist, but the RT cost for
low conditional probability targets produced no corresponding
benefit for high conditional probability targets.
We believe it likely that instead of providing evidence against
the existence of conditional probabilities in the task (as they were
meant to), our explicit instructions to participants that cue col-
ors had no relation to target colors paradoxically primed them to
explore or perceive exactly such a relationship. Two observations
motivate this assertion. First, several participants were suspicious
of the spontaneous instruction that there was no relationship
between cues and target color (though no participants reported
entertaining or acting upon such suspicions at debriefing). Such
suspicions about the nature of the task may have led them to
engage in exploratory behavior, which could result in the atypi-
cal “cost without benefit” pattern of results in the condition as a
whole.
Second, our (null) results in the no information condition
suggest that participants are at floor performance for learning
the statistics of the task when told nothing about those statistics.
Because one could suspect that the implicit learning of probability
relations might be subtle, we doubled the number of partici-
pants for the three conditions of this experiment over what we
had used for Experiments 1 and 2. This gave us greater power
to detect significant differences in Experiment 4, and makes the
negative results relatively more secure. Changes in conditional
probability effects between the no information and misleading
information conditions correspond to changes in learning and/or
acting upon the statistics of the task. Since participants are at floor
performance when given no information, such changes must log-
ically be in the positive direction. On the basis of this evidence,
we conclude that our misleading information condition actually
functioned as a cue that there was a relationship between the cues
and target color to be discovered. If a fourth condition were to be
implemented with exactly this “partial” information, we would
expect to see results similar to those in themisleading information
condition.
Overall, these results suggest that explicit knowledge of the
probability relationships between cues and target color is neces-
sary for conditional probability to facilitate search performance
at the time scale (about 40min) and number of trials used here.
These data do not directly address whether this information
would be learned implicitly if more time or trials were allowed,
although we speculate, based on results from the misleading
information condition, that such implicit learning is possible.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In Experiments 1–3, we demonstrated that participants cued
to the probable color of the target in a visual search task
search more efficiently for high probability targets and less
efficiently for low probability targets; we also showed that
participants did not employ a strategy of exhaustively searching
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high probability stimuli before searching any low probability
stimuli. In Experiment 4, we replicated our earlier results showing
that participants were faster to locate high conditional probability
targets, but only when they were explicitly informed of the prob-
ability relationships between cues and targets. When uninformed
about the cue-target relationships, participants demonstrated no
ability to learn these relationships or to effectively make implicit
use of them; when misled about the cue-target relationships, par-
ticipants showed some sensitivity to them, but were unable to
make use of them to facilitate their search.
Previous work, much of which we review in the introduc-
tion, has been based on search displays which are simple (e.g.,
distractor-less searches), regular (e.g., with stimuli always appear-
ing in fixed locations, often in a grid arrangement), or both (e.g.,
Posner-style tasks in which only one or two stimuli appear in
fixed locations). Such experiments can provide evidence for the
effectiveness of probability as a graded attentional cue, but do
not necessarily generalize beyond the limited search types or the
display structures they employ.
Our results provide evidence that people canmake use of prob-
ability information even under conditions of greater complexity
and variation. Despite conditions of near-total randomness for
the spatial positions of the target and distractors, and despite
significant trial-to-trial variation of distractor number and dis-
tractor color ratio (congruent: incongruent), participants in our
task made use of conditional probabilities to effectively guide
search. What’s more, the modulation of efficiency we observe is
not a result of a wholesale change in search strategy, but rather
is the graded change that would be expected of a probability
manipulation. Not only can probability guide search, but it does
so even when constraints on complexity and spatial relations are
abolished.
We interpret our results as demonstrating that cues can
manipulate participants’ estimates of the likelihood of forthcom-
ing target features—in our case: color—and not that they bias
participant expectations. The distinction between probabilistic
biases and expectations is subtle, but important. As reviewed in
Summerfield and Egner (2009), this distinction is often ignored
or conflated in many studies on attention and the effect of infor-
mative cues. Summerfield and Egner (2009) describe two main
effects of participant expectations. First, violations of expecta-
tions may direct participants to prioritize inspection and evaluate
preferentially surprising locations or objects. Second, expecta-
tions may bias the interpretations of sensory information. Our
protocol did not examine either of these sorts of effects. While
our participants did expect, in the colloquial sense, that amagenta
target would follow two magenta cues, this only served, in the
framework of Summerfield and Egner (2009) to bias attention.
In our task, the search arrays always mixed two colors of items in
roughly equal proportions. While participants could expect the
target to be of a certain color, the appearance of the search array
itself provided no opportunity to violate this expectation and
therefore no opportunity to prioritize some locations or elements
over others on the basis of such a violation. The other function
of expectation, to bias interpretation, was also not assessed in our
task. Our targets were all identified by virtue of a missing corner.
Our participants had no expectation over which corner would be
missing, so there was no information available to them that could
influence their interpretation of potential targets. Had we used a
search array in which items were variously colored between the
extremes of magenta and cyan, or if we had used cues that gave
information as to a target’s missing corner, we might have seen
expectation effects, but we did not use such stimuli or cues. In
short, the cues we used gave information about the likely color
of the target, and as such allow us to interpret our results as
probabilistic cues influencing attentional prioritization.
We have presented evidence that probability guides search;
however, we find virtually no evidence that participants in this
task can learn the conditional probability relationships through
exposure alone, something that might be better characterized
as implicit statistical learning to distinguish it from our explicit
probabilistic cuing. We found this surprising for two reasons.
First, the relation between cue color and target color is simple
and straightforward—more cues of a certain color predict higher
probability for the target to take that color. Second, as highlighted
in the opening of this paper, there is a preponderance of evidence
in support of the ubiquity and automaticity of visual statistical
learning. To conclude this paper, we will highlight some of this
relevant evidence and how it might relate to our own results.
One explanation for the inability of uninformed participants
to learn the relationships of the cues to targets may be the com-
plexity of the task. There are two cues, not one; we changed
the shape and position of the second cue in order to increase
the chance that it is noticed as distinct and attended. However,
these changes were irrelevant for the cue-target contingency. In
such a complex situation, it may be that greater experience than
we gave here is necessary to discover the relevant contingencies.
This relates to another possible explanation for the inability of
our uninformed participants to learn the conditional probability
relations between cues: the non-adjacency of the visual presen-
tation. The cues are presented at the beginning of the task, and
the task ends when the target is located; a demanding (in terms
of visual resources) search interrupts the sequential perception
of the statistically related cues and target. Turk-Browne et al.
(2005) investigated statistical learning using a sequential presen-
tation task in which shape stimuli were presented in an attended
color and an unattended color, and found that nonadjacent rela-
tions were learned only for stimuli in the attended color. From
this, they concluded that statistical learning is gated by selec-
tive attention. Pacton and Perruchet (2008) employed a task in
which participants viewed a sequence of digits and performed
an arithmetic operation on a pair of digits either immediately
succeeding (adjacent pair) or surrounding (nonadjacent pair) a
target digit. Their findings and conclusions were similar to Turk-
Browne et al.; they found that statistical relationships were only
learned for digit pairs that were necessary for task completion,
and they concluded that joint processing was necessary for the
learning of such dependencies.
Our results are in general agreement with this basic idea,
though the term “selective attention” might be too narrow. To
complete our task, it was obviously necessary to perceive and
attend to the target. Our participants also certainly perceived
the cues; each cue was presented alone on the screen for a full
second. However, there were no competing stimuli that would
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require our cues to be selectively attended in the binary sense
implied by Turk-Browne et al. Perhaps amore descriptive require-
ment for implicit learning of statistical relationships would
be that the related stimuli be effortfully processed or inter-
acted with. Uninformed participants in our task had little
incentive to process or interact with the cues beyond their
inevitable passive perception; thus, it is not surprising to us
that they fail to discover the connection between cues and
target.
Ono et al. (2005) investigated statistical learning in search
using a paradigm quite similar to Chun and Jiang (1998). They
repeatedly presented pairs of trials in which target position on
the current trial was cued by the target position, distractor con-
figuration, or a combination of both on the previous trial. They
found that when all features of a previous trial were held constant
(target position on no distractor trials, distractor configuration
on targetless trials, and both target position and distractor con-
figuration on target present trials with distractors) participants
learned the relation between the previous trial’s characteristics
and the location of the target on the current trial. However, when
any aspect of the previous trial was allowed to vary (resulting
in one predictive feature and one random feature) learning was
abolished. Ono et al. explain these results using a signal: noise
framework; predictive features generate signal, random features
generate noise, and statistical learning requires aminimum signal:
noise ratio.
Our data support such an explanation. By the above defini-
tion, there is a great deal of noise inherent in our paradigm. Half
of our trials (the 0.5 conditional probability condition) feature
non-predictive cues, and every trial involves a search of some
length that can also be considered as noise (since the distractors
have no predictive value). This explanation also aligns with the
selective attention/joint processing account of implicit statistical
learning outlined earlier: selectively attending or processing a cer-
tain subset of stimuli can be equated to enhancing the signal of
the processed set while simultaneously filtering out the noise of
the unprocessed set.
We suspect that this is the crux of our participants’ inability
to learn the cue/target relations in our task. In the uninformed
condition, the cues are the aspect of the display least salient to
completion of the task; this could lead to a reduction in signal and
even, possibly, partial filtering of them as noise. Conversely, the
search display itself, the “real” noise (as far as probability learning
is concerned), requires the most intensive processing to complete
the search task.
It is also possible that the difficulty our participants experi-
enced in learning the probability relations in our task is a con-
sequence of those probabilities dealing with information about a
target feature, and not target location. Although there is some evi-
dence to the contrary (Chun and Jiang, 1999) the preponderance
of evidence suggests that spatial information enjoys a signifi-
cant advantage in the realm of implicit statistical learning. For
example, Endo and Takeda (2004) showed that contextual cuing
effects disappeared when the cued information was changed from
spatial position to target identity. In their task involving four
clusters of stimuli, each containing different numbers of poten-
tial targets, Williams et al. (2009) showed that spatial differences
between clusters of stimuli (in terms of likelihood to contain the
target) were detected and leveraged quickly and automatically.
Surprisingly, participants in their task did not implement search
strategies based on features, even though such strategies would
be expected to yield faster RTs than the spatial probability-based
search patterns that they were quick to adopt.
Our own work highlights this divide between implicit statis-
tical learning of spatial vs. feature information. Specifying and
quantifying the conditions under which statistical or implicit
learning occurs is an ongoing challenge in the field. Though we
have tried to be precise in our reports and discussion and avoid
the term “attention,” there is still work to be done in quantifying
exactly how search and other tasks like ours can be parsed into
measurable quantities such as signal and noise. It is our hope that
this paper will be a useful resource to those who work to address
this challenge.
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